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Competition for Open-Access Resources: A
Class Exercise that Demonstrates the Tragedy
of the Commons
Barry L. Johnson and Roy A. Stein
ABSTRACT
Open-access resources, such as fisheries, often suffer from overexploitation due to competition among individuals. To
help students appreciate this phenomenon, we developed a laboratory exercise that uses a computer model of a commercial
fishery to illustrate the inevitability of overexploiting open-access resources. Our model contained two identical popu-
lations that were fished simultaneously: one on an individual, competitive basis and the other on a collective, cooperative
basis. Both populations were governed by identical relationships for recruitment and catch-per-effort, and had constant
growth and natural mortality rates. Competition within the individually-run fishery invariably led to population collapse
whereas the cooperative group usually maintained sustained yields. This exercise demonstrated that optimal resource
use was impossible in a purely competitive fishery and helped students understand fish population biology and commercial
fishing strategies. The exercise can show how changes in regulations or population parameters influence yields from a
fishery. It can be adapted for use in workshops and other professional settings, even for participants with little background
in fisheries.
M any of the world's important re-
sources, from wilderness areas
to fisheries to parking spaces, are pub-
licly owned, and thus are considered
common property resources. Most
common property resources are also
open-access resources, meaning they
are available to all who desire to use
them. Such unrestricted access often re-
sults in excessive levels of use and, ul-
timately, overexploitation or ruin of the
resource. Hardin (1968) has termed this
process, the "tragedy of the com-
mons." The tragedy results from the
economics of exploiting a common re-
source. Use of any resource involves a
positive and negative component for the
user. The positive component (utility in
an economic sense) is a benefit derived
from the resource and accrues entirely
to the user. The negative component is
the cost of damage done to the resource
as a result of use. With a common re-
source, this cost is not borne entirely
by the individual, but is shared by all
resource users. For any individual, the
benefit is almost always larger than his
share of the cost; thus it is advanta-
geous for the individual to increase use
of the resource. However, because this
reasoning applies to all, the result is
escalating use and, ultimately, over-
exploitation.
The development of management
strategies that allow appropriate use of
common property but avoid overex-
ploitation is one of the most pervasive
problems in resource management (e.g.,
Fonda 1971; Hardin and Baden 1977;
Clark 1985). However, students often
have difficulty developing a practical
appreciation for the issues and con-
straints involved in such complex man-
agement problems. To help students
appreciate these complexities, we de-
veloped a participatory class exercise
that demonstrates the "tragedy
of the commons." The exercise uses a
computer model of a commercial fish-
ery, where students act as harvesters,
and helps students gain an under-
standing of basic fish population biol-
ogy and some of the problems con-
fronting a commercial harvester or
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manager. The exercise was designed for
upper-level undergraduate and gradu-
ate students.
The Model
The computer model used in the ex-
ercise was a single-species, age-struc-
tured population model containing two
separate but identical fish populations
(Fig. 1). Each population consisted of
10 age classes, with ages 2 through 9
susceptible to fishing. The model did
not simulate any particular fishery, but
was built on generalized relationships.
Numbers and weight at age followed
typical exponential curves; with these
curves, biomass peaked between ages
3 and 4 (Fig. 2). For simplicity, we as-
sumed constant growth and natural
mortality. Recruitment to age 2 was
governed by a Ricker-type stock/recruit
curve with a random component (Fig.
3). At age 2, 50% of the fish matured
and by age 3, all were mature. Popu-
lations were fished with gill nets of 2-
cm to 9-cm mesh, with 2-cm mesh tak-
ing age-2 fish, 3-cm mesh taking age-3
fish, and so on. Catch in each mesh size
for each boat was based on an asymp-
totic catch curve applied to initial num-
bers in each age class (Fig. 4A). Catch-
per-effort began to decline when the
number in an age class reached 75% of
the initial number for that age class (Fig.
4B).
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Figure 1. Box diagram of the "tragedy of the commons" laboratory
simulation. Boxes within the dotted line represent components of
the computer model. The model contains two identical fish pop-
ulations that are exploited separately by two different fishing fleets.
Input to the model is the effort expended by each fleet, and output
is the resulting catch for each fleet. Both populations are governed
by the mathematical relationships represented in Figs. 2 through
4.
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Figure 3. Stock-recruit relation in the commercial fishery computer
model. Stock is expressed as total number of mature fish, and
recruitment is expressed as year class size at age 2. The dashed
lines represent computer generated random variability (maximum
of + / - 10,000) around the relation.
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Figure 2. Relations for individual weight at age and initial numbers
and biomass in each age class for the commercial fishery model.
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Figure 4. Catch relations in the commercial fishery computer model.
(A) Proportion of age class harvested versus length of gill net
fished by a single boat in one mesh size. Beyond 7,000 m the curve
is flat. The proportion is applied to initial age class numbers. (B)
Catch adjustment factor versus age class size. When numbers in
an age class decline to less than 75% of their initial number, catch
is reduced by multiplying by the corresponding adjustment factor.
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The Exercise
Students were assigned to "boats"
that made up two fishing fleets. Most
of the class was in the "Individual" fleet
where the crew (usually 2-4 people) of
each boat determined the mesh size and
length of net they would fish. The In-
dividual fleet represented an unre-
stricted, competitive fishery. The re-
mainder of the class was assigned to
the "Collective" fleet. In this fleet, all
members collaborated to make a joint
decision about mesh size and length of
net to fish. All boats were then required
to abide by this decision. The Collective
fleet represented a restricted, cooper-
ative fishery.
Typically five boats were assigned per
fleet. Each boat fished a maximum of
10,000 m of net, distributed among the
eight mesh sizes in 1,000-m incre-
ments. For example, one boat in the
Individual fleet (or all boats in the Col-
lective fleet) might fish its 10,000 m by
choosing 1,000 m of 2-cm mesh, 1,000
m of 3-cm, 3,000 m of 4-cm, 5,000 m of
5-cm, and none in 6-9-cm mesh (i.e.,
boat number 3 in Table 1).
The Collective fleet fished one pop-
ulation, while the Individual fleet fished
the other population simultaneously.
Thus, the dynamics of the two popu-
lations could be compared directly over
time. Because each fleet fished the same
total net effort and functional relation-
ships for both populations were iden-
tical, any difference between the two
populations over time resulted from a
difference in allocation of net effort
across mesh sizes.
The model operated in annual incre-
ments. At the beginning of each year,
each boat decided how to allocate its
net effort for that year and reported its
strategy to the instructor who entered
this information into the computer. The
model than calculated annual catch in
each age class, for both populations,
based on effort expended by each fleet.
At year's end, number of mature fish
in each age class was computed by sub-
tracting catch from numbers at the be-
ginning of the year. In age class 2, ma-
ture fish were caught before immatures,
because they were expected to be larger
and more vulnerable to the gear. Stock
size was then calculated by summing
mature fish in each age class and re-
cruitment was determined from the
stock/recruit relationship. Numbers in
age classes 3-9 for next year were cal-
culated by multiplying year-end num-
bers by survival rate. An annual report
of catch and effort was then printed
and distributed to each boat (Table 1).
These annual cycles continued until one
population collapsed; then the exercise
was repeated. Generally, about seven
annual simulations, or 1.5 hours, were
required for a population to collapse.
During the exercise, students were
not given any information regarding
model operation or parameters. Their
only knowledge of the model was the
catch that resulted from effort ex-
pended. Students were required to
analyze annual reports, determine how
the model (i.e., fish population) oper-
ated, and then use that knowledge to
optimize their fishing strategy. The in-
structor, however, did receive an an-
nual summary of population data in-
cluding information on stock size,
age structure, weather conditions for
spawning, and strength of the new year-
class. This information told the instruc-
tor how each population was faring and
could be used to modify the exercise
(see Variations and Possibilities).
To encourage competition among
boats, we told students that grades for
the laboratory would be assigned based
on total weight caught. Annual reports
included cumulative weight caught
(Table 1) and thus provided a ranking
of boats. Because all boats in the Col-
lective fleet had identical catches, they
were ranked together, as a single unit,
against each boat in the Individual fleet.
These rankings were continually up-
dated on the blackboard; high-ranking
boats were encouraged and low-rank-
ing boats chastised. Actually, we as-
signed grades based on a laboratory re-
port, but the ruse worked well to
generate competition. Usually our bluff
was called by the third run of the ex-
ercise. Even then, student enthusiasm
remained high and competition was
strong.
The Outcome
Outcomes of the exercise over suc-
Table 1. Sample annual report produced by the commercial fishery computer model. Each
report includes gill net effort and catch (both numbers and weight) in each mesh size,
for each boat, plus total annual and cumulative weight caught for each boat. The Collective
fleet is represented by a single boat because all fleet members are required to fish iden-
tically.
Catch and effort per boat: year 5
Mesh size
Annual Cumulative
Boat number 2 cm 3 cm 4 cm 5 cm 6 cm7cm 7 cm 9 cm catch catch
COLLECTIVE FLEET
Per Effort(m) 0 1000 3000 4000 2000 0 0 0
boat Catch(#) 0 473 446 209 30 0 0 0
Weight(kg) 0 255 571 523 128 0 0 0 1477 7382
INDIVIDUAL FLEET
1 Effort(m) 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 0 0 0
Catch(#) 1209 380 239 93 38 0 0 0
Weight(kg) 193 205 307 232 164 0 0 0 1101 7415
2 Effort(m) 5000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 0 0
Catch(#) 1904 215 135 52 21 12 0 0
Weight(kg) 305 116 173 131 93 79 0 0 897 6960
3 Effort(m) 1000 1000 3000 5000 0 0 0 0
Catch(#) 683 215 300 146 0 0 0 0
Weight(kg) 109 116 384 365 0 0 0 0 975 7118
4 Effort(m) 3000 3000 3000 1000 0 0 0 0
Catch(#) 1517 477 300 52 0 0 0 0
Weight(kg) 243 258 384 131 0 0 0 0 1016 7357
5 Effort(m) 0 0 0 0 4000 4000 3000 0
Catch(#) 0 0 0 0 54 26 12 0
Weight(kg) 0 0 0 0 235 176 127 0 538 6081
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cessive runs yielded consistent results.
The first run was basically a trial run
where students learned how the fish-
ery operated and began developing
fishing strategies. Usually both popu-
lations collapsed during the first run.
In the second run, some students ap-
proached the maximum-catch strategy.
This was most easily accomplished by
using the catch and effort data for all
boats to create a marginal yield table
(Table 2). Marginal yield is defined as
the catch that results from the last in-
crement of effort; here, 1,000 m of net.
For example, in 5-cm mesh, 2,000 m of
net catches 378 kg and 3,000 m catches
474 kg. Thus, at 3,000 m, the catch which
resulted from the last 1,000 m of net
was 474 kg - 378 kg = 96 kg. Once
the marginal yield table was created,
maximum-catch strategy was deter-
mined by allocating the 10,000 m of net
to the combinations of effort and mesh
size that produced the highest total re-
turn (Table 2). Marginal yields, and thus
maximum-catch strategy, changed as
numbers in each age class changed. But,
the predicted yields in Table 2 were
usually accurate for the first 3 to 4 years.
Other methods used by students to im-
prove their fishing strategies included
calculating catch-per-effort or, for less
sophisticated students, merely copying
the strategies of more successful boats.
Depending upon the analytical skills of
the group, we would sometimes pro-
vide guidance in analyzing data. Dur-
ing the second run, the Individual fleet
crashed their population, whereas the
Collective fleet usually produced a sus-
tained yield.
By the third run, competition among
boats in the Individual fleet resulted in
everyone approaching the maximum-
catch strategy. However, this strategy
caused overfishing of young age classes,
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Figure 5. Typical outcome of "the tragedy of the commons" exercise.
The Individual fleet has higher catches initially, but at the cost of
overfishing and stock collapse. The Collective fleet can produce sus-
tained yield.
reductions in stock, and ultimately, re-
cruitment failure. In contrast, the Col-
lective fleet, with its knowledge of pop-
ulation biology, avoided fishing the
younger age classes, thus maintaining
stock and producing sustained yields
(Fig. 5). Therefore, the Collective fleet
ranked low in weight caught initially,
but surpassed all boats in the Individ-
ual fleet within a few years. By the third
run, students in the Individual fleet re-
alized that they could not catch more
than the Collective fleet, and that they
must try to produce sustained yields.
Thus, they began to cooperate to re-
Table 2. Marginal yield of 1,000-m gill net increments for mesh sizes two through seven,
before depletion of any age classes, in the commercial fishery computer model. Underlined
values represent the 10 highest marginal yields and define the maximum-catch strategy
for 10,000 m of net, i.e., 2000 m in 2-cm through 6-cm mesh. See text for how to calculate
marginal yields.
Kilograms per marginal 1,000 m of gill net
Total 2-cm 3-cm 4-cm 5-cm 6-cm 7-cm
effort mesh mesh mesh mesh mesh mesh
1,000 178 256 257 214 157 106
2,000 137 197 198 164 121 81
3,000 81 115 116 96 71 48
4,000 56 82 82 68 50 34
duce harvest of young age classes and
conserve stock.
Sustained yields for the Individual
fleet resulted in more fish for all boats
in the long run. However, these boats
were still ranked individually, with
points awarded accordingly. Thus, there
was much incentive for low-ranking
boats to improve their position. By the
third run, everyone was well aware of
how the fishery operated, and fishing
strategies were similar. This resulted in
weight totals being fairly close, but also
made it difficult for boats to improve
their rank. The easiest way to increase
catch was to dissent from the cooper-
ative strategy, either overtly or covertly
(by cheating). Fishing a few thousand
meters of small mesh net produced
catches large enough to improve a boat's
rank significantly. Because cooperation
was not required, dissension often oc-
curred. If one boat dissented, it moved
up quickly in rank, displacing other
boats downward. This strategy was
doubly effective, because by catching
young fish, the dissenters also reduced
the future catch in older age classes by
other fleet members. In order for the
remaining fleet members to improve or
maintain their rank, they were forced
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to fish smaller mesh sizes also, thus
destroying the cooperative strategy.
Conservation efforts by only a few fleet
members were ineffective because any
young fish they did not catch were
caught by the dissenters. Although the
ultimate result of the third run varied
depending on the ability of the indi-
vidual fleet to coerce members to co-
operate, all outcomes demonstrated the
essence of the "tragedy of the com-
mons": that optimal use of the resource
was impossible in an unrestricted,
purely competitive fishery.
We have used the exercise in grad-
uate seminars, and as the focus of a
laboratory in fishery biology courses at
the Ohio State University, University
of Vermont, and University of Wiscon-
sin-Madison. The exercise always gen-
erated a great deal of enthusiasm in
participants. Student evaluations of the
laboratory were quite positive; nearly
all felt the exercise was a useful, real-
istic learning tool.
Variations and
Possibilities
The exercise can be expanded to show
how changes in population structure
will affect fishing strategy or to evaluate
the effects of regulations on the fishery.
Regulating effort does not require any
changes in the computer program but
can be effected merely by imposing re-
strictions on harvesters. Such restric-
tions might include a minimum mesh
size regulation or allowing less effort
per boat. A student "management
agency" might institute regulations.
Another possibility would be to report
the weather and year-class strength in-
dices to students. They could use these
indices to fine tune their strategies an-
nually, or as a warning of possible pop-
ulation collapse. Also, the computer
program allows the instructor to input
the random component for the stock/
recruit relation in each year. This could
be used to guide population dynamics,
or to simulate a particular sequence of
good or poor years. Changes in param-
eters such as stock/recruitment rela-
tion, age at maturity, survival, growth,
and catch-per-effort would require
changes in the computer program, but
would be relatively easy to make.
Changes in these parameters could be
evaluated singly or in conjunction with
various management strategies to de-
termine under what conditions the
"tragedy of the commons" might be
avoided.
The usefulness of the exercise is not
limited to classroom laboratory situa-
tions. It could easily be adapted for use
with extension groups, management
agency workshops, or commercial har-
vesters. Although participation in the
exercise does require some knowledge
of fishery biology, we have used the
model successfully with groups that
have little background in fisheries. This
merely required taking a few minutes
before beginning the exercise to intro-
duce some basic concepts about pop-
ulation biology and how a gill net fish-
ery operates.
Summary
The exercise proved to be an effective
tool for teaching students about ex-
ploitation and management of open-ac-
cess resources. It allowed students to
develop an understanding, through
their own actions as harvesters, of the
forces producing the "tragedy of the
commons." They exhibited many char-
acteristics shown by exploiters of com-
mon resources in the real world. The
failed efforts of members of the Indi-
vidual fleet to reduce harvest and con-
serve stock showed how competition
among individuals can subvert well in-
tentioned management plans. Students
also saw that individual fishermen are
not inherently evil because they partic-
ipate in overfishing, but may just be
caught up in a situation where they have
no viable alternative.
The exercise was also a good example
of how computer modeling can be used
in education. The computer modeling
approach allowed us to simulate, in a
few hours in the classroom, a situation
that would be very difficult for students
to experience on their own. Participa-
tion in the simulation provided an added
dimension of understanding not avail-
able through merely reading about or
discussing the "tragedy of the com-
mons."
Notes
A listing of the computer program
and user's guide for the laboratory ex-
ercise are available from the first au-
thor. The computer model is available
in versions for the Apple IIe (pro-
grammed in Apple PASCAL) or the
Radio Shack TRS 80, Model 4 (pro-
grammed in TRS 80 BASIC). Both
versions require a disk drive, monitor,
and printer. We would be glad to copy
the program on a 5 1/4-inch floppy disk
if you will provide a blank disk for that
purpose.
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